A recent literature on inequality of opportunity offers quantitative tools for comparisons and measurement based on stochastic dominance criteria and traditional inequality indices. In this paper I suggest an additional way of assessing inequality of opportunity with two indices of dissimilarity across distributions. The indices are based on a traditional homogeneity test of multinomial distributions and are similar to the square coe¢ cient of variation (Reardon and Firebaugh, 2002) . Their properties are studied, as well as their usefulness and limitations in applications when both circumstances and advantages/outcomes are multidimensional. An empirical application measures changes in inequality of opportunity from an old to a young cohort in Peru. The importance of assessing the sensitivity of the results to group definitions and group proportions is highlighted.
Introduction
The concern for inequality of opportunity has long earned its place in the Social sciences and Political Philosophy. Following Roemer (1998) 's in ‡uential conceptualization, recent research has sought to quantify inequality of opportunity and to compare its extent across societies. For instance, Lefranc et al. (2008) compare inequality of opportunity and of outcomes across developed countries using stochastic dominance analysis and proposing a Gini index of inequality of opportunity. Checchi and Peragine (2005) measure inequality of opportunity in Italy based on traditional inequality indices which are decomposable in between-group and within-group elements. Ferreira and Gignoux (2008) extend the same between-group approach to a parametric framework and study inequality of opportunity in Latin America. Barros et al. (2009) compile studies of inequality of opportunity in Latin America, including the advocacy of a Human Opportunity Index (the HOI). Similarly Elbers et al. (2008) have applied new re…nements on the decomposition of inequality indices to tracking changes in between-group inequality in several countries.
The intergenerational economic mobility literature has a longer history of development of quantitative tools. However, since in that literature usually one parental attribute is related to one of the o¤spring's, a pair at a time, most of the toolkit is not well suited to studying inequality of opportunity with multiple circumstances, let alone multiple outcomes. On the other hand the toolkit of the literature on segregation indices, and contingency tables, contains indices that deal explicitly with multiple circumstances. Moreover these indices and those derived from them, are worth considering for applications involving multiple outcomes, as I propose in this paper with two indices.
This paper contributes to the quantitative analysis of inequality of opportunity by suggesting the use of dissimilarity indices related to the statistic of a traditional test of homogeneity of multinomial distributions, which is in turn Pearson's chi-square statistic, but expressed in terms of probabilities. 1 When applied to inequality of opportunity, these dissimilarity indices have the advantage of being readily applicable to comparisons of multidimensional distributions of outcomes, which is an appealing trait in the burgeoning multidimensional welfare measurement literature. Another interesting trait is that the dissimilarity indices attain their minimum value, representing perfect equality of opportunity, if and only if the distributions of well-being outcomes conditioned on social groups are identical. Hence the concept of inequality of opportunity as dissimilarity across conditional distributions, that the indices are measuring, is in line with a literalist interpretation of Roemer's characterizations of equality of opportunity whereby the latter is said to be achieved "if the cumulative distribution functions of advantages across types are identical" (Roemer, 2006, p. 8) . Moreover the dissimilarity indices attain their maximum value if and only if there is complete association between the groups in which societies are partitioned and the welfare outcomes in consideration. The indices are most suitable for ordered, discrete variables; whereas for continuous variables they requires prior discretization.
In an empirical application I study changes in inequality of educational opportunity in Peru from older to younger cohorts of adults. Considering as educational wellbeing outcomes, levels of educational attainment and quality of education, measured by type of school attended (public versus private versus none), I compute inequality of opportunities for these two outcomes separately and for their joint distribution. The ensuing cross-cohort trends depend on the de…nition of types and on whether the index used is sensitive to the proportions of adults in every group. For instance, I …nd evidence of lower inequality of opportunity among the younger cohorts vis-a-vis the oldest ones, for the most re…ned partitions of adults into groups, for all three estimations. The groups of people (or types in Roemer's vocabulary) are de…ned by combinations of gender, paternal and maternal education levels.
In the next section the dissimilarity indices are introduced. Then their behaviour is investigated, considering properties discussed in the segregation and inequality of opportunity literatures. A discussion comparing the indices' orderings to those of existing quantitative tools for univariate distributions follows. Then the reach and limitations of using dissimilarity indices to address multiple outcomes are also discussed. Finally, an empirical application to Peru is presented, followed by concluding remarks.
The dissimilarity index of multidimensional inequality of opportunity
In Roemer (1998)'s in ‡uential conceptualization, advantages (i.e. outcomes) are determined by e¤orts and circumstances. Combinations of the latter determine people's types. Nobody should be held accountable for belonging to a speci…c type since it is beyond the individual's control. Hence as a source of inequality, circumstances are deemed morally irrelevant in the inequality of oppportunity literature Hild and Voorhoeve (2004) . They should not a¤ect the advantage either directly or indirectly through e¤ort or random shocks. Therefore, in many de…nitions of equality of opportunity, the distributions of the advantages should be identical across social groups de…ned by sets of circumstances. The dissimilarity indices discussed in this paper relate to a literalist de…nition of Roemer (1998 Roemer ( , 2006 in which equality of opportunity is achieved if and only if the conditional distributions of outcomes/advantages are equal across circumstance sets. This particular de…nition can be further characterized by stating that it relates to a situation in which both Roemer's assumption of charity and Fleurbaey's equal well-being for equal responsibility Fleurbaey (2008) hold. The assumption of charity says that individuals belonging to di¤erent types would exhibit the same distributions of e¤ort should their de…ning circumstances be factored out Roemer (1998, p. 16 ). An allocation of resources following the criterion of equal well-being for equal responsibility is characterized by an equalization of a well-being outcome across types for every di¤erent level of dedication. 2 This de…nition is equivalent to the strong criterion of Lefranc et al. (2009) . Another equivalent way to characterize it is to associate perfect equality of opportunity with Fleurbaey's circumstance neutralization: a situation in which individual well-being can only be expressed as a function of responsibility characteristics (i.e. dedication, Romer's e¤ort, or morally relevant factors), and not of circumstances. 3 Should any of these conditions fail to hold then the distributions of well being conditioned on type-belonging would not be identical and viceversa.
The indices presented in this paper are closely related to indices from the rich segregation literature, 4 particularly to the squared coe¢ cient of variation. These indices work on probability space, thereby being specially suited to deal with multivariate distributions of discrete variables. Several of them also handle multiple groups, hence they are applicable to multiple circumstances. To de…ne this paper's indices, assume that societies are partitioned into a set of individuals'types, de…ned by a combination of values taken by a vector of circumstances; i.e. factors over which the individual does not exert control, e.g. parental education, ethnicity or gender. Generally, z circumstances are considered, each of which is partitioned into g i categories (for i = 1; 2; : : : z), making every circumstance a vector, V i , with g i elements. By combining all the possible values in the vectors of circumstances a vector of types is de…ned. Formally, types are generated by a function f that transforms combinations of circumstance values into a natural number representing the ensuing type:
The vector of types, G = f1; 2; :::; T g, has then T = Y z i=1 g i elements. All individuals having the same set of circumstances are said to be of the same type. The absolute frequency of people in a society belonging to type t ( t 2 G) is N t , and the total population sample is N . Similarly outcomes or advantages can be considered, generally, in a multidimensional way. All possible combinations of outcomes (e.g. health status with education achievement, earnings, etc.) are in vector O = f1; 2; :::; Ag. Assuming there are b outcome vectors, V j , each having m j elements (for j = 1; 2; : : : ; b), then multidimensional outcomes are generated by a function q that transforms combinations of individual outcomes into multidimensional outcomes:
m j elements representing a combination of outcomes, each one partitioned in the mentioned m j elements or categories. 5 The absolute frequency of people in a society attaining outcome is N : Finally, the probability of attaining a given combination of advantages (e.g. = k) conditional on being of type t is: p t k . The corresponding absolute frequency of people being of type t and attaining a combination k is N t k . Therefore
The indices of dissimilarity advocated in this paper belong to a general class of statistics which measure the degree of dissimilarity between distributions as the degree of association between row variables and column variables in a contingency table. For instance, the column variable may represent the conditioning variable (e.g. the types) and the row variable may represent the outcome variable. Following Reardon and Firebaugh (2002) , these indices can be derived from a family of indices that compute the average of a dissimilarity function, f : [0; 1] ::: [0; 1] ! R + , that is sensitive to the divergence between p t k and p ; where p is a weighted average of the group-speci…c probabilities for outcome state in which the weights are given by the share of each sample size on the total sum of them. It is the pooled-sample probability of having outcome :
The family of indices computes the average f over p (8 ) and the relative size of each type in the population: w t = N t N :Hence this approach of segregation as disproportionality in group proportions (Reardon and Firebaugh, 2002, p. 39-40) proposes the following family:
When: f p t ; p = p t p p 8 2 N ++ the following subfamily, X ; of (2) emerges:
The weighted average probability performs the comparison of the probabilities across the different types' samples. The closer the respective probabilities across samples then the more the weighted average probability resembles each and every of its constituting probabilities (in (1)), rendering the statistic in (3) closer to zero. The dissimilarity indices proposed in this paper are based on the statistic of a test of homogeneity among multinomial distributions (e.g. see Hogg and Tanis, 1997 ) that ensues from the general class, X , when = 2:
5 For instance an element 2 O and equal to "1" might stand for having tertiary education, excellent health status and the highest earning capacity (i.e. the categories can represent intervals too).
6 In Reardon and Firebaugh (2002) the respective function for the family is:
M is the number of groups in the population, T is the size of the population, j is an organizational unit (e.g. school), m is the percentage of the population belonging to group m and jm is the probability of belonging to group m conditioned on being in organization unit j. Notice that, by contrast, p t stands for the probability of attaining a state of wellbeing conditioned on belonging to group/ type t.
N X
The null hypothesis of the test is that the T distributions are homogenous, i.e. identical in a statistical sense. Besides being related to a standard test of multinomial distributions, another advantage justifying the choice of X 2 T;A (among many other options from class X ) for a dissimilarity index of multidimensional inequality of opportunity is that this statistic also has a maximum value which conveniently depends only on the number of groups (e.g. the number of types) and the number of states (e.g. the values that the outcome variable takes). The maximum value is easily found by noticing that the statistic of the homogeneity test of multinomial distributions is Pearson's goodness-of-…t statistic:
Intuitively one can bring together all the conditional probability vectors, i.e. the multidimensional distributions of outcomes conditional on a given type, to form a contingency table. In such a table N t k is the observed frequency of individuals from a type "t" exhibiting a level of multidimensional advantage k; whereas the expected frequency for "t" and k under the null hypothesis of lack of association between circumstances and advantages/outcomes is given by the expression Everitt, 1992) . Therefore, (5) can be expressed as:
where the OB stands for observed and the E for expected frequency. Cramer (1946) showed that the maximum for an expression like (6) is N X 2 T;A;max = min(T 1; A 1)N , and that is, precisely, the maximum for the statistic (4). Thus dividing (4) by N X 2 T;A;max , yields the …rst dissimilarity index:
The index is advocated for applications in which A > 1. It is very similar, but not identical, to the square coe¢ cient of variation by Reardon and Firebaugh (2002). 7 The second dissimilarity index is a special case of the …rst index ,(7), in which: w t = 1 T ; that is, all type weights are set to be equal:
where p~ = 1 T P T t=1 p t . Compared to (7), the index in (8) has additional population invariance properties, 8 with respect to that in (7), rendering it useful whenever it is desired that only changes 7 The squared coe¢ cient of variation by Reardon and Firebaugh (2002) , when expressed in terms of types and outcomes, is equal to: C = in the conditional distribution probabilities, and not changes in the proportions of types in the population, can impact on the degree of inequality. E¤ectively, the index (8) takes a "representative agent" approach to compare the di¤erent conditional distributions.
Behaviour of the indices
In this section the behaviour of the indices is elucidated by explaining the situations under which the indices attain their maximum value of between-type inequality; by analyzing their ful…llment of other properties discussed in the segregation literature; and by deriving some results that clarify the e¤ects of migrations of individuals, from one outcome state to another, on the value of the indices.
The indices'maximum inequality
The indices (7) and (8) measure the degree of between-type inequality in terms of the degree of association between types and outcomes. In the context of a contingency table having two variables with two states each, Kendall and Stuart (1973) propose two notions of maximal association: A …rst property of the two dissimilarity indices (7) and (8) When T = A , the maximum value of the indices is attained under absolute association. That is, every type t 2 G is exclusively associated with one outcome 2 O:Being of type t implies having outcome and viceversa.
The lack of overlap required in order to attain H 2 T;A = 1; when T < A, can take di¤erent forms. Therefore, in general, indices measuring inequality on probability space do not distinguish between di¤erent forms of non-overlap when they reach their extreme values of complete (or absolute) association. 10
Properties ful…lled by the indices
The second property ful…lled by the two indices is that they attain their minimum value of 0 if and only if the conditional distributions of outcomes are identical across types. The general property is the following:
Condition 1 Perfect Equality (PE): Any index of dissimilarity obtained using the approach of segregation as disproportionality in group proportions 11 attains its minimum value if and only if p 1 = p 2 = : : : = p T 8 = 1; : : : ; A:
The proof for indices (7) and (8) Because the indices are evaluated on probability space they also ful…ll a property of monotonic transformation invariance:
Condition 4 Monotonic Transformation Invariance (MTI): Inequality is not a¤ ected by any common monotonic transformations to the values of the outcome variables and to the boundaries of the partitions of outcomes that determine the probability distribution.
Another important property ful…lled by both indices is population invariance, i.e. they are insensitive to identical replications of each individual:
Condition 5 Population Invariance (PI): If every individual is multiplied by a factor > 0, then inequality is una¤ ected.
The proof is straightforward. Let p t ( ) be the probability of attaining state conditioned on being of type t and given a replication of . Then p t ( ) = N t N = p t : Likewise, using a similar de…nition for w t ( ), it turns out that: w t ( ) = N t N = w t . Therefore both indices'values do not change. A similar property is ful…lled by index (8) but not by index (7). Reardon and Firebaugh (2002) call it composition invariance and it states that inequality should be unchanged when the replication of individuals is type-speci…c:
Condition 6 Type Population Invariance (TPI): If every individual belonging to type t is multiplied by a factor t > 0 (8t 2 [1; T ]), then inequality is una¤ ected.
Indices like (8) fu…ll (TPI) because they are independent of the type weights. Therefore they are "margin-free", taking a "representative agent" approach to the measurement of between-group inequality. There are good reasons to choose indices that ful…ll (TPI), and to choose indices that do not ful…ll (TPI). 13 The literature on segregation discusses an important property called organizational equivalence. According to this property the measure of segregation should not change when an organizational unit (a type in the context of inequality of opportunities), is divided into k units, each with the same probability distributions as the original unit; or when k units with the same probability distributions merge into a single unit (e.g. type) (Reardon and Firebaugh, 2002, p. 38) . This two-sided property can be rede…ned in the following encompassing way:
Condition 7 Type Replication Invariance (TRI): If every type t, and its corresponding conditional distribution of outcomes, is multiplied by a factor t > 0 (8t 2 [1; T ]), then inequality is una¤ ected. 14 The indices (7) and (8) ful…ll (TRI) under special settings. In the case of (7)
; where S = P T t=1 t . It is easy to show that: for H 2 T;A ( t ) = H 2 T;A ; when 9k j k 6 = 1; 15 it is necessary (and su¢ cient) that A T and A S. A su¢ cient (but not necessary) condition for H 2 T;A ( t ) = H 2 T;A ; when 9k j k 6 = 1 is that T = S: In the case of (8) the same results follow after w t is replaced with 1 T : Alternatively if either A > T or A > S, then (TRI) is ful…lled if and only if T = S. 16 Finally, the indices ful…ll an important condition related to their reaction to some migrations of individuals between outcomes: 1 3 Reardon and Firebaugh (2002, p. 38) point to references of a debate in the segregation literature regarding the desirability of the "margin free" property.
1 4 If t 2 N+=f1g; then type t is being subdivided into t subtypes, each with equal conditional distributions of the outcome to the original type. Alternatively if t = 1= t j t 2 N+=f1g; then several types with identical conditional distributions of the outcome are being con ‡ated into one single type.
The squared coe¢ cient of variation by Reardon and Firebaugh (2002) ful…lls (TRI) because it is normalized by the equivalent of A 1; as opposed to minfT 1; A 1g. Therefore the comparison between this coe¢ cient of variation and the indices (7) and (8), highlight a trade-o¤ between ful…llment of (T RI) and reaching a maximum value of 1 when A > T and there is complete association.
Condition 8 Sensitivity to migrations that break or restore partial pairwise equality of opportunity (SMPEP): A migration of an individual from outcome state j to outcome state i increases inequality if states j and i were characterized by partial pairwise equality of opportunity before the migration; and, conversely, it reduces inequality if states j and i get to be characterized by partial pairwise equality of opportunity (PPEP) after the migration.
In condition 8, partial pairwise equality of opportunity (PPEP) is de…ned as follows: 9 ( ; ) 2 [1; :::; A] j p 1 = p 2 ::: = p T = p ^p 1 = p 2 ::: = p T = p . The indices (7) and (8) ful…ll (SMEP), i.e. they react by increasing their value to re ‡ect higher association (and inequality) when within-type migrations from one state to another break PPEP and they react by decreasing their value when a similar migration restores PPEP in the departure and arrival state. The proof is in the Appendix 8.
General reaction of the indices to migrations of individuals between outcome states
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In this subsection the behaviour of the index is ‡eshed out further by analyzing its sensitivity to association between types and outcomes. It turns out that most changes in the distribution of outcomes across types (e.g. due to intra or inter-type transfers) have an a priori ambiguous e¤ect on the index. Notable exceptions are migrations related to condition 8, and migrations away from (or toward to) a situation of complete (or absolute) association in the pairs of departure and arrival states. Generally, the nature of the e¤ect depends on whether the migration brings about an increase or a decrease in the degree of association between types and outcomes, i.e. the criterion by which inequality of opportunity is measured by the indices. In the context of probabilities, distributional changes come about by changes in the number of units (e.g. individuals) which fall into the cells of the contingency table, i.e. by migration of units from one cell to another. In the application to inequality of opportunity, units can only move across cells representing di¤erent outcome values within each type column but not across types, because people are, by de…nition, unable to change own circumstances beyond their control. Consider the contingency 
The minimum change that could occur in the table is that one observation from type migrates away from outcome row j, ending up in outcome row i. Such change is related to a change in at least four variables: N j ; N i ; N j and N i ; and correspondingly in at least four probabilities: p j ; p i ; p j and p i . When N units move away from outcome j toward outcome i, p j transfers to p i the amount of , 19 while p j transfers w to p i . To measure the impact of such a change on the indices, units of value belonging to type migrate from outcome state j to outcome state i. The new probabilities are decorated with a hat and the proposed migration implies that:
A p z y and mH min fT 1; A 1g H 2 T;A . Then:
which yields:
As equation (10) shows, the migration of probability mass, , generates an a priori ambiguous e¤ect on the index. A reasonable result since the index is measuring inequality as increased association and migration may or may not bring about more association between types and outcomes. Such migration may or may not bring about more similarity across the probabilities p t j and p t i (8t 2 T ). Increasing similarity across probabilities from di¤erent types related to the same outcome cell, e.g. , means reducing the degree of association betwen types and outcomes.
The following situations describe the sensitivity of the indices with respect to the di¤erent situations in which migration can take place:
When the probabilities across types are not identical in both departure and arrival states, j and i before and after the migration: The e¤ect of the migration is ambiguous as shown by equation (10).
When the probabilities across types are identical in the departure state, j. In this case p t j = p j 8t 2 G. Here there are three sub-situations:
1. The probabilities in the arrival state are not identical before and after the migration. In this case, as shown in the Appendix 8, the e¤ect is again ambiguous: The migration away from j does increase the value of the index because originally p t j = p j 8t 2 G, and that is captured by the …rst element of the right-hand side of (12). 20 However the e¤ect of the migration on the degree of similarity across probabilities in the arrival state, i, may or may not increase the overall degree of association. Hence the ambiguity. 2. The probabilities in the arrival state are not identical before the migration but are rendered identical afterwards. In this case, besides having p t j = p j 8t 2 G, the following also holds:
The impact on the index is again ambiguous because migration away from j increases association but migration toward i reduces it. The contribution to the change in the value of the index of these opposite impacts to the respective coe¢ cients of variations of states j and i is mediated by the proportion of the total population in every state. The change in the index due to migration in this situation is in equation (13). 21 A necessary condition for this migration to reduce the value of the index is: p i < p l i , which makes sense to assume if the probabilities in the arrival state are meant to be equalized after the migration. The condition is, however, insu¢ cient. 22 3. The probabilities in the arrival state are identical before the migration. This case means p t i = p i^p t j = p j 8t 2 G and the migration increases inequality. This is the case relevant to condition 8.
When the probabilities across types are such that there is complete, or absolute, association between types and outcomes in the departure and arrival states, j and i respectively, before migration. This situation depends on whether T < A; T > A or T = A. The respective proofs are in Appendix 8, and used also to show that the indices attain their maximum in situations of complete, or absolute, association between all types and all outcomes (not just the departure and arrival states):
1. Whenever T 6 = A migration can either leave the initial complete association intact thereby not a¤ecting inequality or complete association between the types and the two (departure and arrival) states.
2. Whenever T = A any migration breaks the initial absolute association thereby decreasing inequality.
The indices and other concepts and indices of inequality of opportunity
This section compares the performance of the dissimilarity indices in ranking societies, in terms of inequality of opportunity, vis-a-vis other well-known concepts and measurements of inequality of opportunity in the literature. The idea is not to show any superiority of one approach over others, especially in an area where "no consensus has been reached" (Lefranc et al., 2009 (Lefranc et al., , p. 1189 ; but to explore the di¤erences in rankings that di¤erent approaches to inequality-of-opportunity measurement yield, focusing on the di¤erences that arise from introducing the dissimilarity indices. Lefranc et al. (2008 Lefranc et al. ( ,2009 The de…nition of Lefranc et al. (2008) declares equality of opportunity whenever there is no secondorder dominance across the outcome distributions corresponding to di¤erent circumstances. Such is a very reasonable de…nition from the point of view of a hypothetical outsider who has to choose between di¤erent types and is concerned about the risk and return mix involved in every type's conditional distribution of outcomes. As Lefranc et al. (2009) equality of opportunity is only achieved under circumstance neutralization, which is a more general version of Roemer's literalist de…nition, and is followed by this paper's indices. Since lack of second-order dominance can be achieved with di¤erent combinations of compared distributions, Lefranc et al.'s (2008) criterion may declare two societies to be opportunity equal even when in one all conditional distributions are identical and in the other one both the mean attainment and the degree of inequality in one type may be higher than in another type (in a case of two types in both societies). In an extreme situation, the dissimilarity indices might declare the former society as being opportunity equal while regarding the latter as perfectly opportunity unequal if the latter exhibits complete association between types and outcomes. 23 These discrepancies are best illustrated by looking at Lefranc et al.'s Gini index of inequality of opportunity:
The conception of
Where is the mean of the welfare measure (e.g. income) over the whole population, i is the respective mean for type i and G i is the Gini coe¢ cient for type i. Whenever a society is opportunity-equal according to Roemer's literalist criterion, and the dissimilarity indices, GIO is zero, thereby measuring equality of opportunity according to both Roemer's and Lefranc et al.'s de…nitions. However the reverse is not true: GIO may be zero and imply equality of opportunity in terms of lack of second-order dominance also when distributions of the advantage/outcome are not equal (thereby implying inequality according to alternative de…nitions). These di¤erences in rankings stem from attempts at answering di¤erent, and complementary questions. The most stringent de…nitions of equality of opportunity (e.g. Roemer's literalist criterion) and indices based on dissimilarities of probabilities, seek to quantify the departure from circumstance neutralization, and tend to be insensitive to the location of the di¤erences between types in the conditional distributions thereby being unable to say anything regarding the desirability of one conditional distribution over another. Whereas, by focusing on second-order dominance, Lefranc et al. provide a weaker criterion that is sensitive to the presence of between-group inequality in di¤erent parts of the distribution, therefore not measuring inequality as circumstance neutralization but as inability to rank type-conditioned distributions in terms desirability (as judged by the second-order dominance criterion). Peragine, 2005; Roemer, 2006; Ferreira and Gignoux, 2008) The types approach compares across types/groups a standard that represents and summarizes their conditional distributions. Empirical applications of this approach have typically associated increasing inequality of opportunity with increasing between-groups/types inequality in mean outcomes. The desirable properties that indices of the types approach satisfy are discussed in Peragine (2004) . Roemer (2006) also considers this approach as a less literalist (and empirically demanding) alternative criterion. Its key advantage is that, by comparing mean outcomes, the ensuing rankings satisfy the axiom of inequality neutrality within types, which implies that mean-preserving transfers, that a¤ect within-type inequality, do not a¤ect between-type inequality (Peragine, 2004, p. 6) . Other quantitative approaches in the literature do not ful…ll this axiom, including the dissimilarity indices.
The indices based on the types approach (Checci and
That is, in the other approaches, within-type transfers (or migrations in probability space) a¤ect both within and between-type inequality. The dissimilarity indices and indices based on the types approach 24 may disagree in their social rankings in two main instances: Firstly, whenever there is no between-group inequality in the standard of the distribution, the types approach declares equality of opportunity. The dissimilarity indices might not do so because equality of distributional standards (e.g. the means) can occur even when the multinomial distributions are not homogeneous, e.g. when circumstance neutralization is not present. Secondly when two societies are compared and both exhibit complete (or absolute) association but one has between-group inequality, according to a path-independent decomposition, coupled with no within-group inequality and the other one has some within-group inequality and may or may not have between-group inequality. In such a case the relative version of the indices based on the types approach, i.e. the between-group component divided by total inequality, ranks the …rst society as being perfectly opportunity-unequal and the second one as being less opportunity-unequal; whereas the dissimilarity index ranks both as being perfectly opportunity-unequal on the merit of both exhibiting complete (or absolute) association between types and outcome categories. 25 This second source of discrepancy disappears if the absolute version of the indices based on the types approach is considered instead. 26 In that case, only the …rst instance is relevant.
The indices based on the tranches approach (Checci and Peragine, 2005)
Checchi and Peragine (2005) propose an alternative measure of inequality of opportunity also based on inequality indices decomposable into between and within groups. They follow a literalist interpretation of Roemer's notion that people exerting the same degree of e¤ort, measured by their percentile position in their respective type's e¤ort distribution, should receive an equal amount of the advantage/outcome. Then, assuming monotonicity between (unobservable) e¤ort and observable advantages, they measure inequality of opportunity as inequality in the outcome between individuals belonging to di¤erent types but exerting the same degree of e¤ort, captured by belonging to the same percentile tranch, thence the name tranches approach. 27 Indices based on the tranches approach agree with the dissimilarity indices in declaring equality of opportunity if and only if conditional distributions of well-being are identical.
By contrast, the relative version of the tranches-approach index used by Checchi and Peragine (2005) does not rank all distributions characterized by complete (or absolute) association as being perfectly opportunity unequal, 28 because it has total inequality as its maximum, which is a reasonable normalization if the objective is to decompose inequality into e¤ort-led and circumstanceled components. However complete (or absolute) association between types and outcome sets, which make the dissimilarity indices attain their maximum, is possible with di¤erent distributions of the outcome (re ‡ecting e¤ort through the monotoncity assumption) within each conditioning type/group. (Barros et al., 2008) Let p 1 be the average accomplishment related to a dichotomous outcome (e.g. access to a basic service); p t 1 is de…ned similarly with respect to a speci…c group of society, t. Then the human opportunity index (HOI, Barros et al. (2008) ) is de…ned as:
The Human Opportunity Index
where D is a dissimilarity index based on a statistic belonging to the above speci…ed family:
It is worth comparing D and H 2 T;2 , which deals with dichotomous outcomes. 29 D works with dichotomous variables whereas this paper's indices work with multinomial distributions, including dichotomous variables. Therefore this paper's indices can also be applied to quantify inequality in access to services, although they may not rank societies the same way as D does. D is less useful to compare multinomial distributions because its maximum value (necessary for normalization) does not depend just on the population size. Instead it depends ad hoc on the groups'weights. 30 Barros et al. (2008) extensively discuss the choice of normalization for D: Firstly, it gives D an appealing meaning as "the minimum fraction of the total number of persons with high outcome [...] that needs to be redistributed across circumstance groups in order to [...] ensure equal proportion to low outcome persons in all circumstance groups" (p. 19); secondly, it renders D either insensitive or prone to decrease when p t 1 increases by a common factor for all t. 31 Regarding similarities, both D and H 2 T;2 declare equality of opportunity whenever p t 1 = p 1 8t. However in the absence of perfect equality of opportunity, D and H 2 T;2 may not necessarily rank societies consistently among themselves. In particular, they di¤er in their sensitivity to a special form of "balanced increase in opportunity" considered by Barros et al. (2008) : a common additive increase, i.e. a migration that increases the probability of attaining the cherished outcome by the same amount for all types. As Barros et al. (2008) show, such migration reduces the value of D, thereby revealing a "pro-growth bias" (p. 29). By contrast, the reaction of H 2 T;2 depends on whether p 1 is higher, equal or lower than 1 2 . If it is higher, then the common additive increases 2 9 The HOI follows a tradition of de…ning welfare indices which account both for the average and the dispersion of a welfare outcome, started by Atkinson (1970) and Sen (1976) .
3 0 Although this can be overcome by either de…nining: w t = 1 T (i.e. imposing TPI ) or by adopting the Mean relative deviation index, which is normalized by Simpson's interaction measure (Reardon and Firebaugh, 2002, p. 41) . is equal to 1 whenever there is maximum dissimilarity as measured by D. However d is not population invariant except when there is maximum or minimum dissimilarity. This trade-o¤ between population invariance and a normalization axiom is absent from H 2 T;2 (and H 2 T;A in general). Both approaches can be defended on theoretical grounds. raises the value of H 2 T;2 ; the opposite happens if p 1 < 1 2 ; and the index is insensitive to the migration if both quantities are equal. 32 The two indices also di¤er in declaring maximum inequality of opportunity: Maximum dissimilarity for D implies maximum dissimilarity by H 2 T;2 but the reverse is not true; because for D the only situation in which maximum dissimilarity holds is that of one individual having a value of 1 and the rest of the population having a 0 for p 1 . Whereas for H 2 T;2 all situations in which there is a subset G 1 G for which p t 1 = 18t 2 G 1^p t 1 = 08t = 2 G 1 and, by implication, p t 2 = 08t 2 G 1^p t 2 = 18t = 2 G 1 , exhibit complete association. The unique maximum of D is a special case of the set of maxima considered by H 2 T;2 .
These discrepancies emphasize the need for conceptual criteria to decide which type of index to use for dichotomous outcomes. When the dichotomy is about achieving a valuable situation (e.g. access to a service), I advocate using D since it is reasonable to consider that there is more inequality of opportunity when one individual has full certainty of achieving the outcome and all the others have zero probability of attaining it, than when more than one individual has full certainty and the rest of the population has zero probability. I advocate using H 2 T;2 when the dichotomy re ‡ects two options whose ranking is not immediately obvious in terms of valuability, or when one wants to assess the dissimilarity of conditional distributions, and one is content to declare perfect inequality when one option is exclusively associated with a subset of types and the other option is exclusively associated with the remaining subset. 33 
Application to multiple variables
An interesting feature of indices like (7) and (8), measuring inequality of opportunity on probability space, is that they can be applied to situations with multiple variables. The joint consideration of two or more outcomes has advantages over considering inequality on each outcome separately, yet it also bears potential limitations. Both analyses can be deemed complementary.
On the side of the advantages, looking at di¤erences between groups on their joint distributions of outcomes provides information that is not captured by looking at each variable's marginal distribution separately. For instance, because several joint distributions can belong to the same Fréchet class, 34 it is possible that, comparing two societies, a variable-by-variable analysis of inequality of opportunity may yield perfect equality in both societies, i.e. if the types'joint distributions belong to the same Fréchet classes in each and both societies, whereas an analysis focused on the joint distribution di¤erences may yield di¤erent rankings. In addition to that, considering inequality over the joint distributions, on top of the marginal distributions, can be justi…ed by extending the concepts of second-order dominance by Lefranc et al. (2008 Lefranc et al. ( , 2009 ) to multiple dimensions. That is, individuals may rank certain joint distributions in terms of preferences for mean attainments, risk, and association of outcomes, re ‡ected in certain classes of welfare functions for which dominance conditions could hold. The indices (7) and (8) do not rank inequality of opportunity in terms second-order dominance conditions, 35 but they do declare perfect equality to hold if and only if 3 2 See results in Appendix 9. 3 3 For instance considering agriculture versus non-agricultural occupations (e.g. Bossuroy and Cogneau, 2008) . It is not a priori clear that one of the occupations is better in some meaningful sense; such judgment depends on speci…c contexts. Another example is to distinguish between blue-collar and white-collar workers, where, as is known (e.g. Giddens, 2006) , not all workers quali…ed as white-collars in developed countries, e.g. low-rank clerks, are, for instance, …nancially better-o¤ that all workers quali…ed as blue-collars, e.g. highly skilled artisans.
3 4 That is, they share the same marginal distributions (Frechet, 1951) . 3 5 In order to do that, an extension of the ideas by Lefranc et al. (2008) is required, using multivariate stochastic the conditional joint distributions are equal across types, thereby extending Roemer's literalist de…nition, and the circumstance equalization principle, to multiple dimensions. 36 The di¤erences in rankings arising from focusing on the joint distributions vis-a-vis the marginal distributions of outcomes separately is illustrated in the following example: Consider a society with two types, T 1 and T 2 , and two outcomes, Y and X, each taking three values (e.g. x 1 < x 2 < x 3 ). The joint distributions of the two types are the following: If the indices are estimated considering the joint distribution it is clear that perfect equality does not hold (e.g. p T 1 (X = x 1 ; Y = y 1 ) 6 = p T 2 (X = x 1 ; Y = y 1 )). However if the indices are estimated for each of the marginal distributions separately, perfect equality does hold, for each variable, since the distributions of T 1 and T 2 belong to the same Fréchet class. Now consider a migration within type T 1 , such that after the migration: p T 1 (X = x 1 ; Y = y 1 ) = 0:1 and p T 1 (X = x 3 ; Y = y 1 ) = 0:1. Then the indices estimated over the joint distribution decrease in value because the migration generates PPEP. However, after the migration, the joint distributions do not belong anymore to the same Fréchet class: The indices estimated for the marginal distribution of X do not yield perfect equality anymore. Therefore it is possible to decrease inequality of opportunity in the joint distribution of variables even at the expense of increasing inequality of opportunity in (at least one of) the marginal distributions. Hence looking at the joint distributions may provide information di¤erent from, and complementary to, an analysis of variable-by-variable. 37 On the side of the limitations, assessing inequality over probability space carries an implicit weighting of the contributions of inequalities in each outcome variable over total inequality. This implicit weighting may be controversial in some situations. For instance, when there is complete (or absolute) association between types and one variable's values/outcomes, and T m, where m is the number of categories/values of the variable with whom there is complete (or absolute) association. 38 In such case, complete (or absolute) association is also su¢ ciently established between the joint variable outcomes and types making the indices attain their maximum value. Generally, if there is complete (or absolute) association between types and each variable belonging to a subset l b, where b is the number of variables, then the indices attain their maximum value when applied to the joint distribution of the b variables, if and only if 9i 2 l j T m i , where m i is the number of categories/values of variable i. Thus the partitions of the variables a¤ect the implicit contribution of each variable's inequality over the whole. 39 In these situations, i.e. when complete (or absolute) association between types and a subset of variables leads to maximum inequality over the whole subset, as measured by the indices (7) and (8), the variable-by-variable analysis can be complemented by an alternative family of composite indicators of inequality of opportunity that aggregates the speci…c-variable results. For instance: dominance conditions. The latter have been discussed, among others, by Atkinson and Bourguignon (1982) .
3 6 In the analysis of multivariate poverty dominance, Duclos et al. (2006) pioneered the idea that even when some dominance conditions can not be ascertained over the marginal distributions, it is possible to …nd signi…cant areas within the joint distribution in which restricted dominance holds. Thus they justify looking at the joint distributions of outcomes.
3 7 At the extreme though, perfect equality of the joint distributions implies perfect equality of the marginals. 3 8 And, by construction, A > m, for two or more outcomes. 3 9 Admittedly, this situation is more problematic when continuous variables are discretized.
where H 2 T;A i measures inequality of opportunity over variable i, which has A i values; ' i is the contribution of inequality over variable i to overall inequality and is a CES parameter that gives more weight to the more unequal variables as it increases. 40 The advantage of using members of the family in (11) 41 is that complete (or absolute) association between types and a subset of variables does not automatically translate into maximum inequality by (11), i.e. when all variables are considered. However the avoidance of this situation comes at the cost of foregoing information on the joint distributions.
Empirical application
This empirical application looks at inequality of opportunity of educational outcomes in Peru. Two discrete outcomes are studied: levels of education attained and quality of education attained, proxied by type of school attended. The adult population is divided into 6 types which result from combining the following three circumstances: gender, father's education and mother's education. All these are beyond the control of individuals, as is demanded by the ineuqality of opportunity approach. 42 The purpose of the application is to compare several cohorts of adults in terms of inequality of opportunity over these outcomes, in order to uncover a possible trend. The indices are therefore calculated for educational level and for quality separately, but also calculated for their joint distribution. Using indices (7) and (8), it is possible to assess the impact of the Type-Population-Invariance condition on the cross-cohort comparison. Inequality trends are also estimated for di¤erent type partitions; namely, for a simple gender division, and for a division only according to parental educational background. The idea is to assess the robustness of the trend results to di¤erent forms of type (dis)aggregation; and also to explore whether trends in inequality based on certain circumstances (e.g. gender) help to explain the trends in inequality based on the types that, in turn, are constructed from those circumstances, interacted with others. 43 In the inequality-of-opportunity literature, Ferreira and Gignoux (2008) discuss the impact of having limited information for the de…nition of types, on measuring between-group inequality on value space: As more groups (therefore …ner partitions) are allowed for, more of the total inequality is explained by the between-group element. 44 When measuring between-group inequality on probability space, the de…nitions of groups may vary depending on available data. In the case of inequality of opportunity, it depends on whether there is information for the circumstances that are deemed to de…ne the types. 45 Di¤erent group de…nitions may generate di¤erent conditional distributions, because 4 0 H can also be de…ned forH
. 4 2 Ideally a …ner division would have been desirable but I cluster educational categories due to sample size concerns. 4 3 I would like to thank an anonymous referee for suggesting performing this analysis. 4 4 Considering that, in applications, it is di¢ cult to gather full information on circumstances determining types, Ferreira and Gignoux (2008) state that empirical estimates provide "lower bounds" of the true/actual degree of inequality of opportunity. In the case of the indices (7) and (8), a …ner partition of types leads to unambiguously higher between-group inequality when T M , for the minimum T considered. Otherwise the result is ambiguous. 4 5 The choice of circumstances to be considered for the de…nition of types may not just depend on the availability of information (on them), but also on the policy implications of the analysis, i.e. on whether these circumstances are considered worth compensating for. they consider di¤erent choices and combinations of circumstances, each in turn di¤erentially associated with outcomes. Therefore, di¤erent inequality patterns may ensue from di¤erent group/type partitions, which warrant a sensitivity analysis. 46 Following the previous section's discussion, a priori it is impossible to say whether inequality over a joint distribution (measured on probability space) is higher or lower than over its related marginal distributions seperately. In fact changes in inequality over joint distributions do not necessarily imply changes in inequality over its marginal distributions and viceversa, even though the latter stem from linear combinations of the former. Hence computing inequality over the joint distribution of well-being outcomes can provide information about inequality of opportunities on top and beyond that provided by the marginal distributions.
Data
The data come from the Peruvian National Household Survey, ENAHO 2001 which sampled 16,515 households. There are 7 possible multidimensional outcomes stemming from the following values for the outcome variables:
Years of education:
No education (=1). Some primary, incomplete or complete, but no secondary (=2). Some secondary, incomplete or complete, but no tertiary (=3).
Some tertiary education (=4).
Quality of education:
No education (=1).
Attended public school (=2).
Attended private school (=3).
The combination of these two variables yields 7 categories because the "no education" entries only interact with each other. The 6 types ensue from combining the following three variables:
1. Gender: Male or Female 2. Father's education: Up to complete primary or More than complete primary 3. Mother's education: Up to complete primary or More than complete primary Strictly, the combination of these three variables should yield 8 categories but, due to sample size considerations, I consider equally people who have one parent with more than complete primary regardless of whether this parent is the father or the mother. 47 I also perform the analysis for just a gender disaggregation, and for only three types produced by pooling gender in every parental-educational-background category. The respective sample sizes, together with the marginal distributions for the two variables, are in the Appendix 7. From the tables it stands out that, the younger the cohort, the higher the schooling attainment: the rates of the two lowest educational outcomes decline monotonically with the youth of the cohort as the proportions of the two highest educational outcomes increase (Figure 1) . Within each cohort, adults whose parents had higher levels of education have distributions of educational attainment, and type of school attendend, with higher incidences of better outcomes i.e. that …rst-order stochastically dominate the distributions of those whose family background exhibits lower educational attainment (Tables 9 and 10 ). Between males and females, distributional di¤erences are narrower among the youngest cohorts in terms of school attendance (especially on the extreme outcomes), and type of school attendend (Figure 4 ).
Results
The values of the indices (7) and (8) for the two educational variables, separately and jointly, appear in Table 2 and 3, respectively. The three estimations agree in showing a pattern of reduction in inequality of opportunity over these educational outcomes from older to younger cohorts. The degree of overlap between the contiguous con…dence intervals varies by cohort pairs. In cases like that of type of school attended and the 42-51 and 52-61 cohorts as measured by index (8), the lack of overlap shows a statistically signi…cant di¤erence in the indices, whereas for the same variable, but comparing 52-61 versus 61+ with index (7), the degree of overlap suggests that the di¤erences may not be statistically signi…cant. However, for type school attended Tables 2 and 3 show a monotonic decrease in inequality of opportunity from old to young cohorts. 48 The di¤erences between the indices of the extreme old and young cohort are statistically signi…cant.
In the case of education levels and the joint distribution the patterns are not monotonic for the index not ful…lling (TPI), (Table 2) . A reduction trend is apparent in both but it is reversed from the second-to-youngest to the youngest cohort. For education levels and the joint distribution, the youngest three cohorts show less inequality than the oldest two and the di¤erences between the youngest three and the oldest cohort are statistically signi…cant. On the other hand, according to the index ful…lling (TPI), the reduction in inequality over levels and the joint outcome is monotonic. Therefore this application o¤ers empirical evidence in favour of the hypothesis that educational outcomes among younger Peruvian adults are less opportunity unequal vis-a-vis older Peruvian adults. This trend is clearest for the type of school attended, which may be driven more by an increase in enrollment than further homogenization of private school enrollment. For education levels and the joint distribution the reduction is not monotonic for index (7), although even for this index there is a signi…cant reduction in inequality comparing the extreme ends of the cohort spectrum. In other words, the youngest cohorts's joint and marginal distributions are closer to the ideal of circumstance neutralization than those of their oldest fellow citizens. The robustness and sensitivity of these results is …rst probed by de…ning types only in terms of gender. The results are in Appendix Tables 11 and 12. Considering that gender proportions are stable over time in countries, like Peru, not characterized by strong son preferences, the two indices consistently show that, after an increase from the oldest to the second-to-oldest cohort, inequality tends to decrease among the younger cohorts for type of education, level of education and the joint distribution. The youngest cohort exhibits the lowest degree of inequality compared to all the other cohorts, re ‡ecting progress in reducing gender di¤erences in educational opportunities. Tables 13 and 14 show the inequality trends for three types de…ned on parental background (i.e. by aggregating the six types over gender). Now the trend depends on whether the index satis…es (TPI) because the types' proportions changed across cohorts. According to index (7), there is no clear pattern of decline in inequality. For type of education and the joint distribution a U-shaped trend shows up, but not for educational level. This lack of steady decline, combined with the results for an exclusive gender division, may explain the patterns in Table 2 , whereby a decline in inequality is slightly reversed at the youngest cohort. By contrast, according to index (8), the decline in inequality is monotonic for type of education, level, and the joint outcome. Hence this result, coupled with the gender-speci…c results (mild increase followed by steady decline), helps to explain the pattern of monotonic decline found in Table 3 . Overall, the conclusions from the empirical assessment depend both on whether a "representative agent" approach is undertaken (i.e. the index ful…lls TPI ) and on the type de…nition. For instance, the evidence from the most re…ned type de…nition used, together with an index ful…lling (TPI), suggest a monotonic decrease in inequality of educational opportunity over the two variables considered.
Concluding remarks
This paper proposes dissimilarity indices, based on Pearson's statistic, for the analysis of inequality of opportunity. In ‡uenced by Roemer's and Fleurbaey's conceptions, they measures inequality of opportunity in proportion to the degree of association between sets of circumstances and sets of outcomes. A higher degree of association is related to higher dissimilarity of distributions conditioned on type-belonging; and, in turn, higher inequality of opportunity.
These indices bear the advantage of being able to capture di¤erences in the joint distributions of multiple outcomes. Therefore they provide additional information on inequality, considering that joint distributions may be di¤erent even when marginal distributions are identical across groups, and people may have preferences over these di¤erences. On the other hand, under certain conditions involving the number of types and outcome values, maximum inequality over the joint distribution may be attained su¢ ciently when complete (or absolute) association is present in only one separate dimension. Another contribution is the proposal, and empirical illustration, of two alternative indices: one is sensitive to changes in group composition; the other one is not, thereby measuring inequality with a "representative agent" approach. This paper's index, the HOI 's D, and the types and tranches approaches, do not judge which group or type is the most advantaged. For that an analysis of risk, return and stochastic dominance is required, as per Lefranc et al. (2008) . All approaches, including this paper's, agree in classifying societies as opportunity equal when conditional distributions are identical. However the dissimilarity indices and the types approach may disagree in ranking opportunity-unequal societies since the latter relates inequality of opportunity to inequality over a distributional standard of the variable. If inequality of opportunity is understood in terms of association, or distance between multinomial distributions, then one can …nd distributions of outcomes which are di¤erent despite having the same distributional standard.
On the other hand the dissimilarity indices agree with the tranches approach in declaring inequality of opportunity if and only if conditional distributions of well-being are identical. However the indices and the relative version of the tranches approach may disagree on the ranking of distributions characterized by complete (or absolute) association. The indices rank all these distributions as being perfectly opportunity unequal; whereas in the tranches approach di¤erent between-tranch inequality may yield di¤erent values of the relative indicator for di¤erent societies characterized by complete (or absolute) association.
The dissimilarity indices belong to a family of inequality-of-opportunity indices, including those of the types and the tranches approaches, which do not account explicitly for average attainments. Among those which do, the most prominent are the GIO and the HOI. 49 A major di¤erence between the dissimilarity indices and the GIO is that the latter declares equality of opportunity not only when conditional distributions are identical. Regarding the HOI, both its D and this paper's indices agree on declaring equality if and only if conditional distributions are equal. They also agree on declaring perfect inequality whenever one individual has full certainty of attaining an outcome while the rest of his/her society has zero chance of attaining it. However they may disagree on: (1) ranking societies in intermediate situations of inequality with imperfect association; (2) ranking societies with di¤erent forms of complete (or absolute) association between types and outcomes; 4 9 The dissimilarity indices discussed in this paper, as well as others from the segregation literature, could also be used to generate indices similar in spirit and shape to the HOI. For instance, for a continuous variable one such index could be: H = y 1 H 2 T;A , where y is the mean of a continuous variable y. As another example, for a discrete variable it could be: H = x xmax 1 H 2 T;A , where x and xmax are respectively the mean and maximum value of a discrete variable x. The suitability of these measures may be worth discussing in future research, along the lines laid out by Barros et al. (2008). and (3) their sensitivity to "balanced increases in opportunity".
In the empirical application to educational opportunity in Peru the indices provide evidence of a statistically signi…cant reduction in educational inequality of opportunity among the younger cohorts of adults, vis-a-vis the oldest ones, considering the most re…ned type de…nition that combines gender and parental educational background. The reduction trend is monotonic for type of school attended (which makes a di¤erence in terms of quality of education and labour market outcomes in Peru). It is also observed, but not monotonically for index (7), for educational levels and the joint distribution of these two outcomes. These types do not exhaust all the groups of people which can be de…ned in the Peruvian sample according to circumstances beyond the adults'control. For instance parental occupation or ethnicity could have been considered with richer and larger samples. The de…nition of types is important not only because, in principle, a more re…ned partition may lead to higher between-group inequality (Ferreira and Gignoux, 2008) , but also because, on probability space, di¤erent combinations of circumstances (when de…ning types) may exhibit di¤erent degrees of association with the same outcomes. Likewise, the empirical application illustrates the potential di¤erences in results ensuing from using indices that are (or not) sensitive to type/group compositions. For instance, in the application to Peru, only the index that satis…es TPI declares a monotonic reduction in inequality of opportunity, from older to younger cohorts, over type of school, level of education and joint outcomes, that is robust to the three types'partitions.
This paper seeks to emphasize the value of the dissimilarity approach, from the segregation literature, to measuring inequality of opportunity. Future work ought to explore further the potential and limitations of measuring inequality over multiple dimensions of well-being on probability space; as well as focus on …nding quantitative tools to measure multidimensional inequality of opportunity using continuous variables (and combinations with discrete variables). to which the migrating unit belongs leaves the index unchanged.This result also holds when complete association is present across the whole contingency table, i.e. when the index attains its highest value.
Appendix
2. A migration of a member of type from j to i that breaks complete association between the types and the departure and initial states. This sort of migration requires that type is exclusively associated with outcome j but not with i. 51 This situation involves another type k which initially, before the migration, is exclusively associated with outcome i. This type of migration implies: w p j = p j ; w k p k i = p i ; p t i = 08t 6 = k (including p i = 0). Plugging these conditions into equation (10) yields equation (15), which shows that the value of the index decreases. This result also holds if the whole contigency table exhibits complete association, i.e. when the index attains its maximum value before migration. Equation (15) proves that a pairwise breakup of complete assocation in the table reduces the value of the index. Likewise an inverse migration that restores or generates these exclusive associations is re ‡ected in the index by an increase in its value.
Case 10 When T = A type is exclusively associated with departure state j but, by implication of T = A, it is not associated with arrival state i. Therefore a migration from j to i is characterized by the same conditions as the second sub-situation of the case when T < A; 52 and has the same e¤ ect: a reduction in the value of the index. 53
Case 11 When T > A there are again two possible sub-situations:
1. A migration of a member of type from j to i that leaves complete association intact. When T > A every outcome is associated with a di¤erent subset of types. Therefore for perfect association to remain intact after such migration it has to be the case that the association with type is given up by outcome j in favour of i. Therefore p j = ; b p j = 0; p i = 0; b p i = . This migration leaves the index also unchanged, including when there is complete association across the whole contingency table.
2. A migration of a member of type from j to i that breaks complete association between types and the departure and arrival states. Unlike the …rst sub-situation, now p j > ; b p j = 0; p i = 0; b p i = : This migration breaks the complete association and reduces the value of the index. The same result ensues if complete association is prevalent across the whole contingency table.
The joint proof for these latter two sub-situations is the following: In a situation of complete association, when T > A; state j is exclusively associated with a subset of types: G j G. Therefore p t j = 18t 2 G j^p t j = 08t = 2 G j . Similarly, before the migration, state i is exclusively associated with 5 1 The opposite, that the type is exclusively associated with the …nal state of migration and not with the original one, is impossible by de…nition of the example in which the idea is to break initial complete association. 5 2 That is: w p j = p j^w k p k i = p i^p t i = 08t 6 = k (including p i = 0) : 5 3 Notice that this analysis assumes that p j > w . Otherwise the migration under initial perfect association renders state j without observations/individuals and mH becomes indeterminate. This indeterminacy is reasonable since the contingency table changes shape (it contracts) when this migration happens and initially p j = 1 N . a subset G i G such that p t
